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  Antonia Pont 
   
Inaccurate Autobiography – the ‘true-
invention’ of a life  
  
  Abstract 
This paper takes the Aristotelian binary of praxis and poiesis and 
approaches the process of autobiography via its double lens. Drawing on 
a reading of Hannah Arendt done by Julia Kristeva, it considers the 
question of whether the activity (that is: praxis) of making-narrative 
might constitute an activity that is particularly ‘human’. It is framed by 
the playful and serious challenge offered by Derridean deconstruction to 
think two things at once, and to practice an inhabiting of binary 
ultimatums. Given this, it goes on to suggest that making in an 
autobiographical fashion, rather than involvinganythingprimarily 
representative or documentary, is more paradoxically akin to the 
invention of what is most true about that which we are in the habit of 
calling ‘our life’. Indeed, it can be argued that this praxisinvents that very 
‘life’ – the latter being an entity or categorythat logically does not 
precede thesame writing that purports to describe it, but rather arises 
with its activity. This self-reflexivity (a manoeuvre that at once describes 
and invokes the very thing described) coincides with Derrida’s 
explication of invention’s mechanism. 
Keywords: autobiography, life, death, Aristotle, Kristeva, Arendt, 
narrative, Derrida, writing, invention, praxis, poiesis, Badiou, ontology, 
the hinge, self-reflexivity, truth, play 
  
  
‘The chief characteristic of this specifically human life, 
whose appearance and disappearance constitute worldly events, 
is that it is itself always full of events which ultimately can be told as a 
story, establish a biography; 
it is of this life, bios as distinguished from zoe, 
that Aristotle said that it “somehow is a kind of praxis.”’ 
– Quoted by J. Kristeva in Hannah Arendt: Life Is a Narrative, 8. 
  
In his seminal work, Of Grammatology (1997), Derrida brings to the 
reader’s attention the word ‘hinge’ [la brisure] as a possible aid to the 
thinking of two things at once. Deconstruction, the notoreity of which is 
often attributed to and associated with Derrida, challenges us – among 
other things – to withstand the discomfort of thinking two incongruent 
conceptssimultaneously and to resist the urge either to collapse them 
swiftly into a hierarchy, or to cancel out one with the other. This, I 
propose, constitutes a kind of practice, a practice of thought and 
expression, andis a possible hintfor engaging with philosophy’s implicit 
question – how to live? 
The term ‘hinge’, borrowed by Derrida from Roger Laporte (French 
author and critic) will, according to the former, open the possibility for 
‘designating difference and articulation’. Here the former quotes the 
latter: 
This word is brisure [joint, break] ‘ –broken, cracked part. Cf. breach, 
crack, fracture, fault, split, fragment, [brèche, cassure, fracture, faille, 
fente, fragment.] –Hinged articulation of two parts of wood- or metal-
work. The hinge, the brisure [folding-joint] of a shutter. Cf. 
joint.’(Derrida 1997: 65) 
The term ‘hinge’ would assist, also then, in Derrida’s broader agenda to 
think that which would eschew the metaphysical absolutes of presence or 
absence. A hinge will be an almost broken part that functions not despite, 
but thanks to, its instability. Not able to be relegated to the simple 
category of wholeness, it does not designate any kind of definitive, non-
relational break. A hinge is the mechanism that facilitates the changing 
relationship between two surfaces or planes. It creates the possibility of 
gradient, as well as openings and closings. A hinge accompanies a door – 
that which welcomes and/or excludes. This image of a doorway is also an 
ontological one, since doors, entrances and thresholds speak to our ability 
to conceptualise beginnings, and therefore origins. One is either shut-out, 
or already within time, the journey, the happening, etc. To think, 
however, the trembling at the fulcrum of the beginning is to think a 
doubling, or an at onceness, that is difficult to accommodate within a 
calculated binarising or arithmetic thought (on this point, see Pont 2009). 
Derrida’s sincere commitment to rethinking ‘presence’, or deconstructing 
its function within copious textual examples, might – I contend – relate to 
broader concerns about totalitarianisms – within thinking, aesthetics, 
politics, and then the possible practical consequences of these in recent 
20th century history. To long for presence, in a naïve way, I read Derrida 
to be cautioning, risks a kind of striving for perfection and wholeness that 
itself can drive towards the exact opposite of what is phantasised: 
orchestrated disintegration, terror and radical deconstitution of living 
beings. 
This paper, then,will attempt to perform a hinge-like function. That is to 
say, rather than only saying, it will also do something. The central 
concern of the writing here, then, involves the threshold between 
description and action/creation, and attempts to perform the complicitness 
of this oscillation via the praxis of describing it. In other words, we will 
inhabit a space that is concerned (but not solely) with the abstractly 
ontological, but which also teeters on the thought of praxis, life, ethics 
and the pragmatic.  
  
Writing: Praxis or Poiesis 
Let us take up Kristeva’s helpful framing of the notion of praxis, 
accompanied by Aristotle’s writings. In her reading of Arendt’s The 
Human Condition, Kristeva summarises: 
[Arendt’s] reading of the Nicomachean Ethics leads her to distinguish… 
poiesis, an activity of production, from praxis, an activity of action. 
Arendt alerts us to the internal limitations in the production of works: 
labour and ‘works’ or ‘products’ ‘reify’ the fluidity of human experience 
within ‘objects’ which we ‘use’ as ‘means’ with a view to a given ‘end’; 
the seeds of the reification and utilitarianism to which the human 
condition succumbs are already within poiesis understood this way. 
(Kristeva 2001: 14) 
Poiesis, then, would have as its teleology a specified thing and a thing of 
substance, at that; or in the case of labour, the completion of a necessary 
task (doing the dishes, bathing the children). Wood-working will lead to a 
useful table, and what matters is the usefulness, the utilitarian value of the 
table. 
Kristeva then goes on to speak of praxis: 
Conceptualized with the notion of energeia (actuality) by Aristotle, praxis 
includes activities that are not orientated towards a specific goal (ateleis) 
and leave behind no created work (par’autas erga), but instead ‘are 
exhausted within an action that is itself full of meaning.’ (2001: 14) 
Praxis would actualise itself, as itself, and not necessarily as a means to 
something else. Its only trace, dare we state it this way, is a relational – 
rather than a substantial – one. This would be the art of the artist (perhaps 
Woolf’s writer with a room of her own). It would be the practice of 
placing paint on the canvas, or moving the body around the dance studio, 
but not in order to produce a work that could sell, nor a video 
documentation of the choreography. For Arendt, it will relate to the life of 
the polis and that which she defines as specifically human: narrative. 
There is a way in which quotidian writing (or the making of texts, and 
texts themselves as written artifacts) can, as one possible mode for 
narrative (and not the classical one, which would be theatre, favoured by 
Aristotle), be analysed using the lens of these two terms. What, in the first 
instance, would the features or attitude of a writing that conformed to the 
notion of poiesis be? 
It might – hypothetically – involve a writing that was specifically oriented 
in its production goal and directed towards an outcome that could be 
known in advance. For a writing conforming to poiesis, the action (verb) 
of the writer would mean little aside from its needing to generate the 
outcome such as the published artefact, fame or royalties, for example. Or 
even just an accurate shopping list. 
On the other hand, praxis might be at play in various and unidentified 
ways in the daily activity of many types of writers. This reminds us of 
Rilke’s confidence to his young poet that one probably should only write 
if one absolutely has to (see the first letter, Rilke 1954). Such writers, who 
have to write and are compelled to engage in this process, are possibly 
less motivated by the tangible outcome and therefore more aligned with 
the praxis side of Arendt’s binary. 
It is obvious, however, that there is no pure example of either praxis or 
poiesis, but that they hold varying degrees of sway in the process of 
writing, which is both a kind of object-making and an experience in and 
of itself. The lens, however, offered by Aristotle, does do a particular 
work for thinking, allowing an analysis of motivations and subtle 
differences in approach to be identified and somehow rigorously 
described.  
An overly dominant poiesis approach might, as Arendt seems to suggest, 
tacitly lead in the direction of totalitarianism, where ‘men’ themselves 
become tools for outcomes alone, and that no-one’s life, including that of 
the ‘totalitarian man’, holds any meaning or worth at all (Kristeva 2001: 
4). This is the possible unfolding at the extreme end of poiesis’ spectrum. 
Similarly, there would be a point where the emphasis on praxis (on action 
or the activity itself) becomes unhelpfully hyperbolic. This might be at 
work in the disdainful artist who, fearful of the threat of poiesis 
contaminating the purity of her process, cannot deign to allow anything to 
come to fruition in a substantial or saleable form. This, among other 
factors, may lead to starving artists and a particular kind of artistic elitism 
or ghettoisation (and is a defining aspect of clichéd Bohemianism [see in 
general Wilson 2003]).  
Without sliding towards a fundamentalism, a praxis-inflected approach 
can take the pressure off obsessing about where everything’s going and 
what is going to come, and focus instead on the quality of process, the 
pleasure (or not) of the activity, and perhaps afford a certain ‘integrity’ to 
the final work itself, which arguably may store traces of this approach in 
the tangibility of its form. This is a highly debatable notion, with opinions 
ranging from the sternly sceptical to the archly certain. A simple 
explanation for the latter position may be that, as humans, and as human-
consumers of products, objects and services, that we engage differently 
with these when we know something of their history and ‘story’. Less 
alienated from the process of their coming-into-being, we may have a 
particular kind of relationship that overflows the bounds of the object’s 
pure use value. Since no-one in this historical moment can claim that 
consumer desire operates in any kind of straightforward manner in 
relation to the pure utility of the object, this filtering of the question via 
the lens of poiesis/praxis is barely a surprising, nor even unusual 
manoeuvre. 
What is helpful, I would suggest, is that Aristotle’s distinction highlights 
a grammatical aspect relating to work, making or the creative in general, 
which is that poiesis operates nominally – that is, in relation to resulting 
substance, or thingness. Praxis, in contrast, is an approach that forces the 
verb into view. Rather than solely noticing what comes, the emphasis is 
shifted to the how of activity. 
The movement of process art, around the 1960s, for example, shows its 
clear debt to the thinking of praxis. This movement emphasised ‘the 
“process” of making art (rather than any predetermined composition or 
plan) and the concepts of change and transience’ (Guggenheim 2001). 
Concerned with the actual doing (and simultaneously with a refusal to 
produce a trace that would be exploitable by capitalism [see Wilson 
2003]) the work can be apprehended as a species of performance, or 
analogously as a kind of rite or ritual. Artists of this movement might also 
explicitly state the motivations for the work or its rationale and 
intentionality. Also interesting is that for process art, there is often 
curiosity concerning the ephemerality or insubstantiality of objects and 
final products. It is not surprising to note that this movement, as it was 
enacting its own identity, was practising in parallel to the growing thought 
of post-structualism, and its broader questioning of the category (or force) 
of Presence. 
  
Narrative as ‘Human’ Activity 
Kristeva will identify in Arendt the idea that the capacity for, and 
engagement with, story-making is what renders the so-called human, 
specifically human(2001: 7). The French term récit  might also bring us 
closer to the act of telling, than perhaps its English translation as 
‘narrative’ might do. If we treat playfully this very deconstructible 
bifurcation, we get the question: is this a matter of praxis or poiesis? 
There will be, for Arendt, a difference between ‘mere’ zoe, and bios (see 
header quote). The making of the events of life into a story, into a 
biographical entity – through a process of identifying where life (the 
story) begins and ends – is what will be particular to the category called 
‘human’. Kristeva writes: 
… the possibility of narrating – grounds human life in what is specific to 
it, in what is non-animal about it, non-physiological. While implicitly 
evoking Nietzsche, who sees ‘the will to power’ as a normal desire in life, 
and also invoking implicitly Heidegger, who steers Nietzsche’s biologism 
towards the ‘serenity’ of poetic expression, Arendt rehabilitates the praxis 
of the narrative. (Kristeva 2001: 8) 
It is uninteresting, for the thrust of the overall argument here, to submit to 
Arendt’s apparently ‘natural’ distinction between bios and zoe. Like the 
praxis/poiesis pair, the positing of such a clear demarcation may serve 
mostly as a lens for applying thought to tendency, thereby making use of a 
purely theoretical opposition as a frame of reference, but one that 
nevertheless cannot stand. One of the difficult contributions from the 
deconstructive advent in philosophy might pertain to this issue of how to 
approach classical binary distinctions, that when placed under pressure 
fall asunder. Derrida has been clear (1997) that it can’t be a matter of 
abandoning this legacy, but rather that the task for thinking is to inhabit it 
carefully, and with an understanding of its ‘hydraulics’ (my term), that is, 
an ability to appreciate the practicality of such framings in particular 
instances, yet also to understand their mechanism at various levels of 
abstraction. It could be summed up, perhaps, as a kind of playful caution 
that includes and complicates. 
So, it is the process of the activity of narration that interests Arendt, it 
seems. While also speaking of what makes a good story, and so forth, at 
this juncture in her writing, what is at stake is something that humans do, 
which for her is ‘non-physiological’, that is, it has no obvious utilitarian 
or survival-related purpose, apart from the fact that the activity of 
making-narrative valorises life, in a way that offsets a totalitarian 
trajectory. 
I do not agree with Arendt’s positioning of the human and the so-called 
animal in such a presumptuous and easy manner. (It would be 
worthwhile, but beyond the scope of this current paper, to investigate 
available theory engaging with this also very metaphysical division. One 
obvious text, however, is Derrida’s ‘The Animal that Therefore I Am 
(More to Follow)’ (2002) in which it is argued that an obvious violence 
done to ‘animals’ is the fact of our naming them, so to speak, en masse, 
thereby obliterating their differences between themselves, and also 
choosing this bulk name on their behalf). However, if we forgive Arendt 
her complicity with anthropocentrism, then we can perhaps take up her 
notion of narrative, which despite being almost excessive [1], presumed to 
contribute little to the ticking over of breathing beings, remains one which 
nevertheless allows the beings that engage in it, a particular kind of 
quality, and one that might be desirable politically and perhaps not so 
dispensable at all. If story matters politically, then one should not dismiss 
so readily its relevance for the ‘mere zoe’ of continuous survival. 
Story, in other words, has a force in relation to the between of humans, 
but not as obviously in terms of their crudest tangible economies, or the 
human as mere-life. Kristeva points out that between-two is the root for 
the word interest: inter-esse (2001: 14). One could speculate about 
whether this term/notion might speak to something of the Heideggerian 
thought of care: ‘care as the Being of Dasein’ (1962). Heidegger will say 
that: 
As one of Dasein’s possibilities of Being, anxiety – together with Dasein 
itself as disclosed in it – provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly 
grasping Dasein’s primordial totality of Being. Dasein’s Being reveals 
itself as care. If we are to work out this basic existential phenomenon, we 
must distinguish it from phenomena which might be proximally identified 
with care, such as will, wish, addiction, and urge. Care cannot be derived 
from these, since they themselves are founded on it. (Heidegger 1962: 
227) 
Care becomes the way to grasp the structural whole of Dasein’s 
everydayness in its totality, and relates to Heidegger’s seeking of an 
ontological foundation for this entity. If that which, according to Arendt, 
makes the human specifically-human is this facilitating of a between (in 
narrative practice) or an inter-esse, narrative would seem to intimate itself 
as something at least somehow relevant to the so-called ontological.  
The possibility in Greek of speaking of ‘life’ using two different terms, 
points to a deficiency in thought for an English (as mother tongue) 
speaker, like myself. What is the ‘mere zoe’ mentioned by Arendt, 
compared to the bios, of ‘biography’, that would be aligned with this 
something that is ‘specifically human’? 
Kristeva will bring us to the notion, crucial to narrative practice, of the 
ability to identify when a story begins and ends. Kristeva informs us that 
Arendt does not make central the cohesion or plot of narrative, so much 
as: 
…firstly to recognize the ‘moment of ending or closure,’ and secondly to 
‘identify the agent’ of the story. The art of narrative resides in the ability 
to condense the action into an exemplary moment, to extract it from the 
continuous flow of time… (2001: 17) 
In the dovetailing of the threads of our discussion up until now, we find 
something curious emerging. Arendt will place emphasis on the inter-
esse, on narrative-as-activity, and on the decision of where a ‘story’ 
begins or ends. Derrida, with his famous and quicksilver offering of 
différance (that which is a species of non-concept) will imply that the 
latter ‘is’ a non-originary-originary ‘operation’ that precedes the nominal. 
Différance tries to gesture towards that which would permit difference 
itself to appear, that ‘movement’ which would logically precede the 
arising of categories, names, and the edges of the thinkable/sayable. We 
also note in Hegel, the present (Gegenwart) viewed as a kind of limit 
(Grenze), ‘the absolute this of time’(Derrida 1982b: 40). Heidegger, too, 
may contribute to this thread in his emphasis on the meaning of the Being 
of Dasein as care, an interested-state that generates the possibility of 
Dasein in an a priori fashion. 
What I would like to suggest, or glean from these thoughts, is that the 
basic, structural operation, that permits what we identify as story to 
emerge, has something in common with the very workings of Derridean 
différance, and that this structural operation – of designating beginnings, 
endings or protagonists (that is, point-of-view, to some degee) involves 
the movement of the trace, the marking – if you like – of the edges that 
permit appearance to appear. I only have a love story, for example, if I 
mark out within the multiplicity of minutiae of days and months, 
conversations, and the rubrics of bodies and landscapes the kind of ‘cut’ 
which brings forth that emphasis. The ‘same’ minutiae of detail could let 
arise a tale of economics, of domesticity, of friendship, and even allow a 
different protagonist to ‘appear’. 
If this be the case, and that means if the two structures – of Arendtian 
story-making and différance – can be even analogously laid alongside one 
another, and if we take up Arendt’s offering that narrative makes distinct 
‘life’ (bios) from the continuous ‘mere life’ (zoe), then to write of a life 
(which would include speaking, as something included in an expanded 
notion of writing) would amount simultaneously to making that life – to 
inventing life, so to speak. And not just one sole life, but many, always 
already – a single, definitive life never being possible. 
Even if in English, we don’t distinguish between the fiction of this raw 
life, or continuous ‘flow of time’ which consequently is eventless [2], and 
the ‘life’ that we live, or that makes ‘us’ as subjects or humans appear to 
ourselves, we seem to be able to almost imagine this difference, to know 
that there may be a qualitative difference between our life – characterised 
curiously by a creative arising-out-of-brokenness:‘the hinge’ – and things 
just rolling onwards. I read Arendt to be suggesting that such a ‘valuing’ 
and ‘perceiving-inventing’ is what makes the category human mean what 
we assume it to mean. 
  
Oughto- or Ought-not-Biography [3] 
Le biographique, en tant qu’autobiographique, traverse plutôt les deux 
ensembles en question, 
le corpus de l’oeuvre et le corps du sujet réel. 
Le biographique est alors cette bordure intérieure de l’oeuvre et de la vie, 
bordure d’où s’engendrent les textes… 
[The biographical, as the autobiographical, traverses rather both 
configurations in question, 
the body of the oeuvre and the body of the real subject. 
The biographical is then this interior border between the work and life, 
the border at which texts engender themselves.] 
– R Gasché in Derrida, L’Oreille de l’Autre, 59. 
  
The so-called self/life/writing (auto-bio-graphy) is a shifting, slippery 
entity or undertaking, composed, as it is, of a trio of semantic components 
that are philosophically loaded and debatable. 
Firstly, the notion of self may be said to be a relatively recent 
phenomenon for thought. It is difficult to ascertain what possible notions 
of self might have been dominant at other historical times, but we are 
cautious enough in our current epoch to hesitate before assuming that the 
content of ‘self’ has been either explicit or constant for different moments 
and eras, for diverse cultural and political milieus. On this point de Man 
reminds us that many scholars debate whether it is possible to speak of 
autobiography at all prior to the 18th century (de Man 1979). For 
Rousseau – that famous autobiographer, masturbator and advocate of the 
notions of childhood and education – the question of self was not 
presumed volatile. As he so charmingly (to our contemporary eyes) writes 
in his Confessions: 
This is the only portrait of a man, painted exactly according to nature and 
in all its truth, that exists and will probably ever exist. Whoever you may 
be, whom destiny of my trust has made the arbiter of the fate of these 
notebooks, I entreat you, in the name of my mistfortunes, of your 
compassion, and of all of human kind, not to destroy a unique and useful 
work, which may serve as a first point of comparison in the study of man 
that certainly is yet to be begun… (Rousseau 2000: 3) 
For Rousseau here, not only is a portrait able to be ‘natural’ and ‘true’, 
but what a portait might be is taken to be obvious. In the well-documented 
paranoia that marked this period of his life, it would appear that he is 
‘unique’ in his commitment to record so honestly his character in this 
activity of portraiture that is, to his mind, rare and unlikely to be repeated. 
Rousseau will, while explicitly arguing the contrary, unwittingly uncover 
the wobbly edges of self-representation, the woes of speech and 
consolations of writing (which Derrida will take up in Of Grammatology), 
but he does not intentionally interrogate the actual category of self. In 
Derrida’s reading of Rousseau, we find the following, now renowned, 
observation: 
… the praise of living speech … is faithful to only one particular motif in 
Rousseau. This motif comes to terms with and is organized by its 
contrary: a perpetually reanimated mistrust with regard to the so-called 
full speech. In the spoken address, presence is at once promised and 
refused. The speech that Rousseau raised above writing is speech as it 
should be or rather as it should have been. And we must pay attention to 
that mode, to that tense which relates us to presence within living 
colloquy. In fact, Rousseau had tested the concealment within speech 
itself, in the mirage of its immediacy. (Derrida 1997: 141) 
The term ‘mirage’ alerts the reader to something that appears, but does 
not deliver. It is, in other words, ghostly. Speech will have a reputation 
for fullness that Rousseau attempts to carry further and mobilise, but what 
he ends up ‘testing’, Derrida asserts, is the fact that speech should have 
done this, but in fact does not. 
In terms of the convergence of matters of self and matters of speech, the 
end of the nineteenth century in Vienna will prove unsettling again for 
this pair speech/writing, and the ‘self’ that would engage with either of 
them. When considering the intentionality of the telling or writing of self, 
Freud’s emphasis on that non-conscious something – that ‘register’, or 
that-which-does-not-have-time (Fenichel 1943: 434-5) – will be a turning 
point for the so-called unicity or reflexivity of the human subject. Badiou, 
in this regard, has the following to say: 
… what Freud introduced with the idea of the unconscious was the notion 
of a human subject that is greater than consciousness – which contains 
consciousness, but is not restricted to it; such is the fundamental 
signification of the word ‘unconscious’. (Badiou 2005) 
Ever since Freud’s scholarship, this non-simplicity of how to think, 
approach or write the auto- of biography has disseminated itself – folding, 
splitting, echoing through the (modernist and post-modernist, and the so-
called fictional and non-fictional) literature of the twentieth century. 
Next, we find ourselves – via this quotation – opening the aspect of the 
trio pertaining to the -graphy. Rousseau, despite his ‘praise of living 
speech’ is a writer (in the colloquial sense), a practitioner of the word on 
the page (and in his Confessions he speaks about his actual experience of 
writing (see for example Rousseau 2000)). Writing, to simplify, appears 
an easier medium for Rousseau’s experience of ‘truthfulness’. He 
struggles in ‘living speech’ to come up spontaneously enough with either 
insults for Parisian shopkeepers, or appropriate conversation with society-
ladies. Writing will enable him to present himself, to his mind, 
authentically, and this only through his physical absence (from society, 
family, in the solitude of his work space). Poor Rousseau! In terms of his 
expected categories of speech = presence, and writing = absence, 
everything will be coming up a-jumble. For this relentless documentation 
of his confusion long ago, Derrida however will applaud him. 
Finally, what of the bio- of this trio (auto-bio-graphy)? We know, for 
Arendt, that bios can be read as designating a kind of excess over and 
above mere zoe, and – I would contend – something marked by finitude as 
opposed to a ‘bad infinity’ of ever-onwards.Bios constitutes something 
that can be called forth from a living-ness, a kind of epokhè – if you like – 
that separates out from a so-posited featureless (non)experience, 
something that can be told, recalled, identified. Whether we accept this 
split or not, we note the subtlety that it allows us to think. Narrative and 
life would have a more extensive relationship than that simply afforded 
by the specificity of the explicitly autobiographical endeavour.  
And what of life compared to death, a central motif in Derridean texts? Is 
this a way to think the bio- of autobiography? If we take our cues from 
the thought of Derrida that we so far know, it is unlikely that he would 
allow the pair life/death to rest in its simple opposition, taken as 
dialectical, hierarchised and ‘true’. More probable is that for Derrida, 
death cannot be situated as the accident that befalls the fullness of life, 
and rather that the two are the minimal dyad, one never appearing or 
thinkable without the other. This calls us to the necessity of thinking the 
ghost, or the spectral aspect always of what it is to be alive. Unlike 
Heidegger, Derrida will not advocate Being-towards-death, reframing this 
constellation of finitude as life with the aphorism: learning to live finally 
(see in general Derrida 2007). Rather than prioritising death and its 
horizon as definitive for the subject, which is more Heidegger’s 
manoeuvre, Derrida will encourage us to think life and death, a 
simultaneity of relation which acknowledges finitude, but also affirms the 
possibility of the impossible (a leap as the infinite, opposed to an ever-
onwards). Autobiography, in this way, might always be an auto-thanato-
bio-graphy (thanatos meaning ‘death’ in Greek), since – as Arendt points 
out – to write narrative is to know both when and where the story begins 
and ends, and then who the characters are. 
  
A Murder of Woes & Inaccurate Autobiography 
Following Arendt’s suggestion, it would seem then that humans – and this 
for her implies the possibility of humanity itself – do something to life in 
general (zoe) but presumably also to their own singular lives, by 
embarking on the labour of telling [lerécit]. If life, as Buddhism teases 
us,is suffering, then narrative (personal, autobiographical, fictional etc) 
might have a certain consequence for this quality, and make life, or lived 
experience of various kinds, something else, while also – at once – 
leaving it the same.   
In fact, it would seem that the transformative consequences for this mere 
life may be greater sometimes, the more closely the narrative 
accompanies the bare and excruciating detail of the former. Toni 
Morrison will speak of this ‘accompanying’ (my term) that is narrative 
practice, not in terms of fact, but in terms of an ‘integrity’ that leads to 
what she considers truth, which is the guiding preoccupation of the 
‘literary archeolog[ist]’ (see generally Morrison 1995). 
This leads me to the term ‘inaccurate autobiography’, which both plays on 
the assumptions carried in the public’s perception of the autobiographical 
as factual entity (in publishing, reality TV, the tradition of the diary or 
journal, to name several), while almost oxymoronically destabilising this 
simplistic assumption with the preceding term ‘inaccurate’. Rather than 
using the double-barrelled creative autobiography, which to my mind, 
might be trying to convey an ornamenting or augmenting excess, over and 
above the humble ‘memoir’, ‘inaccurate’ as intimating the broken and 
always already contaminated notion of not-being-able-to-get-it-right is, to 
me, preferable. In other words, inaccurate autobiography may turn out to 
be truer (in Morrison’s or even Badiou’s sense) than if it had attempted 
and limited itself to so-called ‘accuracy’. 
The charge of indulgence is one with which the writer of autobiography 
(inaccurate or otherwise) must regularly contend. (The charge may also, 
for a wide range of reasons, be an observably gendered one.) The 
accusation functions both at the level of poiesis and of praxis.  
In terms of the former, if the autobiography is asked to function as a 
product, then it is asked to produce something, rather than being 
acknowledged as the trace of a particular doing, in and for itself. The 
autobiography-as-product may function due to its entertainment value, its 
political impact, or its pedagogical capacity. In the case of narratives of 
shared trauma in relation to world events, tales of the holocaust (for 
example Primo Levi’s If this is a Man (Levi 1987)) or the slave narratives 
discussed by Morrison, it is more straightforward to understand the 
potential benefits of this disclosure and exploration. 
Paul de Man acknowledges the charge of indulgence, and partially 
explains it in terms of autobiography being framed as a literary genre 
itself, attempting to compete for import and aesthetic relevance within the 
canonical hierarchy. He writes: 
By making autobiography into a genre, one elevates it above the literary 
status of mere reportage, chronicle, or memoir […] This does not go 
without some embarrassment, since compared to tragedy, or epic, or lyric 
poetry, autobiography always looks slightly disreputable and self-
indulgent in a way that may be symptomatic of its incompatibility with 
the monumental dignity of aesthetic values. (de Man 1979: 919) 
This approach, noted by de Man, but which is not his view, highlights for 
our analytical purposes, the work (of writing-life) as product. Perceived in 
this manner, autobiography is determined as such by whether it – as 
narrative-outcome – correlates to lived detail that might be verified, and 
whether this document, or example of literary production can be 
compared on the wider scale of literary values. 
 If we read, however, autobiography through the lens of praxis, framed as 
a more generalised form of practice-based work, self/life/writing (as a 
grammatically verbal construction) can be framed as a kind of discipline, 
the products of which might or might not be interesting for a reading 




The question, then, is whether there is an elsewhere to auto-thanato-
biography, that is, whether humans (irrespective of whether they put it to 
paper or screen or not) would not at a certain level always and anyway be 
telling their life/death. This would implicitly question the binary that 
Arendt so confidently affirms (bios/zoe). The explicit craft of the 
autobiographer, in other words, may have more to do with profession, 
artistry or simple priorities, and can be seen as an intentional taking up of 
something that in its expanded notion is not unusual at all. Autobiography 
(in this praxis sense) then would be widespread, and may be unavoidable. 
De Man, curiously, makes a very similar point to the one we are distilling 
from Arendt. He raises the question of whether it is assumed that life (that 
purportedly knowable referent) produces autobiography, or whether 
autobiography produces what is called life. He puts it this way: 
And since the mimesis here assumed to be operative is one mode of 
figuration among others, does the referent determine the figure, or is it the 
other way round: is the illusion of reference not a correlation of the 
structure of the figure, that is to say no longer clearly and simply a 
referent at all but something more akin to a fiction which then, however, 
in its own turn, acquires a degree of referential productivity. (de Man 
1979: 920) 
This subtle point corresponds to our broader question. It necessarily 
extends a suspicion regarding cosmologies of referentiality, and deepens 
the gradual sleuthing work in the wake of the Saussurian undertaking. It 
says: our perception of causality’s operation may be skewed, along with 
our understanding of referentiality. Or causality itself (and ontology as the 
form of causal thought interested in beginnings) may be a concept that 
requires complete reassessment, or at least a Derridean complication. 
Autobiography – that commonly accepted repercussion of certain lives – 
may turn out to generate that which we identify as the category of life – or 
living – itself. 
To return to Arendt, the identification of character, framed as being 
crucial to good story, and the distillation of the ‘exemplary moment’ 
(Kristeva 2001: 17) extracted from the flow of time, as a human-
acknowledged event, are both relevant to psychoanalysis and to the 
explicit crafting of tales. To understand who we are, what kind of ‘life’ 
we are in, and who our loves, friends and enemies might be, demands that 
we have always-already embarked upon such decisions. Derrida, in this 
regard, reminds us of what he calls the ‘hyper-ethical sacrifice’ in his later 
work The Gift of Death: 
What binds me to singularities, to this one or that one, male or female, 
rather than that one or this one, remains finally unjustifiable (this is 
Abraham’s hyper-ethical sacrifice), as unjustifiable as the infinite 
sacrifice I make at each moment. These singularities represent others, a 
wholly other form of alterity: one other or some other persons, but also 
places, animals, languages. (Derrida 1995: 71) 
In having been bequeathed this plight of the obligation to sacrifice 
something for something else, always and into the future (as the very 
making of ‘future’), it could be said that we all practice auto-thanato-
biography. We cannot help therefore to be active in this register. In fact, 
this register may be viewed as that which generates ‘we-ness’ itself.  
What we are attempting here is to walk the thinkable threshold between 
that which would be active and passive, or perhaps the constructed 
boundary between the intentional (or so-called conscious) and its other. 
It would seem that I am conceding, following on from Arendt’s offering, 
that there is something important in the praxis of narrating life, something 
that has a force, if not a product, and which may be as intangible as the 
difference between a so-called natural tendency and the action of 
accompanying the same tendency (without interference). Now, this is the 
junction where we would most likely tumble into reliance upon a notion 
of consciousness or so-called awareness (for example: who or what would 
do the accompanying?). At this point, this ideological concept – 
consciousness, which is akin to presence, as we know – comes to our 
presumptuous and tongue-tied rescue. I do not wish to mobilise this term, 
however, and also acknowledge that I cannot do anything else. This term 
‘acknowledge’, of course, brings the argument back around to the human-
subject-who-acknowledges and is therefore deemed to have 
‘consciousness’.  
(And so, I approach the form of my question. I say what I don’t mean to 
say, and know this. And who would be this ‘knower’, and what is this 
‘this’?) 
We always already narrate, even if it is not through speech, or with the 
colloquially understood tool of writing. This expanded idea of ‘narration’ 
comes to us with Arendt’s assistance, while also unfolding logically out 
of our earlier discussion. Narration generates, and decimates. And 
something subtle about its notion might be further developed out of a 
thinking that has grappled with différance. We could, in other words, 
approach narration as the operation that produces lifefrom life – broken, 
out-of-joint, inadequate, nonsensical, impossible life. Narration would be 
that odd kind of activity, that the human subject would appear to ‘do’ 
[machen], but which in fact ‘makes’ [machen] the human subject, as 
Arendt is framing it. 
Narration is, for me (and perhaps in this manoeuvre I careen away from 
Arendt) an encounter with the impossibility of any foundational totality. 
To narrate is always already to supplement a life that isn’t whole (in any 
way that we understand this inconcsistent designation), to labour 
impossibly towards making it whole, to giving it conceptually digestible 
edges. And these efforts always fail, partially, but succeed also in their 
unendedness. The stories we tell to try to make something of the deferrals 
and dis-articulations of ‘our experience’ – their aporias, if we take up 
Derrida’s paradox (see Derrida 1993: 15) – are by definition a kind of 
gracious failure. It is as if we would attempt to circumscribe our 
multiplicities, to strangle ourselves with the edges of the known and pre-
empted, but that something within writing, within the praxis of narrative 
itself, offers us the impossibility of this as a kind of secular blessing. The 
circle in Derrida is never closed, contamination is always already there. 
We narrate life in order to invent it, and to fail continually at inventing it 
once and for all. There will be no definitive definition of any experience, 
and this is both infuriating (when what we think we seek is closure and 
certainty) and also what would save us, and allow the future to remain 
open. It gives us options other than the worst. Quoting Shakespeare’s 
Timon of Athens, Derrida reminds us about the enduring paradox of 
telling about the world, our worlds: ‘How goes the world? – It wears, sir, 
as it grows’ (Derrida 1994: 97). 
  
Lifes 
Life and life. Purportedly bios and zoe. 
We can see even syntactically that the difference between these lifes, 
despite Arendt’s slightly more pragmatic take, (when pushed to the edge 
of its logic) is nothing. This thought of nothing, however, admits that 
nothing might work, even if it doesn’t exist. (This recalls us to Derrida’s 
early statement that ‘the difference between the signifier and signified is 
‘nothing’ (1997: 23). Derrida will reiterate that there is no outside of 
metaphysics, like the uncanny Heart Sutra of zen that declares that there 
is no end to decay and death and alsoan end to decay and death (Daily 
Zen Sutras 2004). Knowing this, however, and watching in the direction 
of this impossibility will, nevertheless, exert a kind of force. I don’t know 
what this knowing, or watching, or reading is. It pertains to 
deconstruction, I suspect. It is not the same as calling on presence or 
consciousness. It is not sovereign, nor does it exercise control, but it takes 
responsibility. 
It could be said that life/death is always already trembling on a threshold 
that constitutes it. Life/death, or bios, with its karmic momentum, is 
always also an extraction of detail, character and time, and this labour or 
compulsion of distinguishing may constitute human nature, as such. 
Structurally, this calls to mind the memorable dialogue between Derrida 
and Paul de Man concerning the autobiographical/fictional opposition. De 
Man will say: 
… the distinction between fiction and autobiography is not an either/or 
polarity but … it is undecidable. But is it possible to remain, as Genette 
would have it, within an undecidable situation? … it is certainly most 
uncomfortable, and all the more so in this case, since this whirligig is 
capable of infinite accelerations and is, in fact, not successive but 
simultaneous. […] 
Autobiography, then, is not a genre or a mode, but a figure of reading or 
of understanding that occurs to some degree, in all texts. The 
autobiographical moment happens as an alignment between the two 
subjects involved in the process of reading in which they determine each 
other by mutual reflexive substitution. (1979: 921) 
As a thinker of deconstruction, de Man reminds us not to get stuck in 
approaching these signifiers through polarity, since this eschews the 
complexity of the matter and their relation. Rather, the situation is 
‘uncomfortable’ and ‘undecidable’, and neither reader nor writer can 
settle into a mode of either autobiography or fiction, since these ‘modes’ 
are oscillating at an infinite pace, determined relatively by the never-still 
interplay between reader/writer. In the example of Proust, it is difficult to 
say, cites de Man reading Genette, whether metonymy provides the 
ground for metaphor to emerge, or whether metaphor is generated and 
metonymy only appears to have been there providing a means towards 
this teleological end (de Man 1979: 921). 
This ties our argument back to both Kristeva’s reading of Arendt and 
Derrida’s deconstructive reading of the thinking of space and time. In 
terms of autobiography’s operating as the fictional practice of inventing 
life, this fiction is real life. It is a true or accurate version of the bios, 
since beneath this fiction, there would be nothing more ‘naturally true’ 
that would constitute the version. The poles of autobiography and fiction, 
then, operate more as a frame for thought, and it would be between these 
poles – in oscillation! – that the activity of thinking proper would occur, 
and where that which is deemed life/death (bios-thanatos) would unfold. 
I contend that this might arguably situate the generation of narrative in a 
register analogous to the ontological. Writing, in both an expanded and 
colloquial sense, does not model itself on a prior existing life. This 
practice of writing is the inventing of life. 
  
Conclusion 
Let us conclude with Derrida’s clarification of invention: 
What is an invention? What does it do? It finds for the first time … 
Finding is invention when the experience of finding takes place for the 
first time. […] 
But in the two cases, according to the two points of view (object or act), 
the invention doesn’t create an existence or a world as an ensemble of 
existences, it is not the theological sense of creation of existence ex nihilo. 
It discovers for the first time, it reveals what was already there… (Derrida 
1987: 35, my translation) 
Writing cannot be said to generate zoe, within Arendt’s thinking. This 
might, in Derrida’s scheme amount more to a creation ex nihilo, the stuff 
of theology. Rather than make this assertion (a larger, and more intricate 
claim, indeed), one can, with more certainty contend, that 
autobiographical praxis may invent, in the sense of finding for the first 
time that which was already there. The elements of life, in other words, 
may well have been findable, but until they were found, and, therefore, 
invented, then there was no life (bios) of which to speak. Since this 
reading of the autobiographical hinges on inventiveness – the stuff of so-
called fiction – we find that autobiography may well amount to the true 
invention of a life. [4] 
It seems that the ‘life’ that we endure and in which we participate is at 
once bios and zoe – an infinite thing, endless, which preceded us and will 
outlive us, but is somehow also alive to us as oursin its brokenness, in its 
quality as brisure, creaky and insistent. I have argued that this difference 
may open onto an ontological register.Thus framed, it can be said to 
evince a praxis, the very same praxis of narrative which allows its binary 
to function and be generative. Binaries like praxis and poiesis are 
invitations to play, to practice that which is at the heart of narration: 
naming nuance and character, deciding/describing breaks and shifts, 
endings and connections. Such an engagement may encouragea wider 
understanding of what it is to live and to participate – actively and with all 
our bafflement – as that rare species of the dead: the living. [5] 
  
Notes 
1. On this notion of excess, see Brophy 2009. Brophy makes the claim 
that although the category of ‘art’ is what is often mobilsed to separate the 
human from the non-, that in fact both art and evolution are themselves 
marked by a radical excess that would paradoxically make creativity 
something that is inherent in the broadest category of life and its 
movement, thereby including but also subsuming the human. return to 
text 
2. See generally Badiou 2007. In this work, Badiou links the possibility of 
the subject at all with its ability to recognise the occurrence of events and 
then to respond to them, making a change to the status quo (the ‘State’) as 
a result of this witnessing, and the subsequent process of fidelity. In the 
second volume of this work (Badiou 2009) Badiou will specifically define 
the subject in a formal way as ‘[t]he mode according to which a body 
enters into a subjective formalism with regard to the production of a 
present. Accordingly, a subject has as its effective conditions, not only an 
event (and thus above all a site)…’ (Badiou 2009: 594). (Note that the 
terms ‘body’, ‘formalism’, ‘event’ and ‘present’ are quite specifically 
defined in this work, and should not be read in their pedestrian sense.) 
return to text 
3. This is not a reference to Derrida’s notion of otobiography, where he 
takes up Nietzsche’s critique of a culture of pedagogy where the student is 
only a listening ear to the institution that pours in its indoctrination. See 
generally Derrida 1982a. Naturally, however, my play on words takes its 
cues from the lineage of Derrida and others in this play between the so-
called phonetic and the inscribed. return to text 
4. This dovetailing of truth and invention (as work of finding) in Derrida 
and de Man merits a comparison with Badiou’s thinking of the Truth 
Procedure that follows on from events (in Badiou 2007). Being haunts the 
situation, and is always there (as Void), and the potential subject 
perceives the gap in the situation in the instance of a event. This is 
arguably akin to finding something which was always already there (in 
Derridean terms). Likewise for Badiou the true will not be a fixed a priori 
category but rather something that emerges from the subject’s process of 
engaging with the event’s rupture. Likewise, the subject itself (as a site 
for ‘life’ perhaps) emerges from the work of ‘finding’ and does not exist 
prior to this. return to text 
5. Obviously referring to Nietzsche’s famous statement. See Nietzsche 
2001. return to text 
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